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Introduction: ‘Institutions Matter’ 
Scientific inquiry leads to incremental discoveries anticipated from the existing body of 
knowledge, but sometimes it also results in a paradigm change if unexpected ‘anomalies’ are 
confronted.2 But in each instance, as past knowledge is worked upon and improved, eithe r 
cumulatively or through changing it fundamentally, scientific knowledge advances to a higher 
plane.  
However, knowledge building in the social sciences, despite claims to their scientific nature, 
often runs in cycles, burying old wisdom for some time, and reinventing it later. Take, for 
example, what Adam Smith, considered to be the chief protagonist of free market theory, had 
to say in his classics treatise on the Wealth of Nations about the embedded nature of market3: 
Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which does 
not enjoy a regular administration of justice…. Commerce and manufactures, in 
short, can seldom flourish in any state in which there is not a certain degree of 
confidence in the justice of government. 
Almost an axiom,4 if you will, this insight was largely buried during the heydays of the 
Washington Consensus in the 1970s and 1980s (perhaps in the zeal of establishing the 
supremacy of Smith’s ideas concerning the ‘invisible hand’ of the market, ignoring that he 
also spoke of its nexus with more ‘visible arms’ of government). Instead, the idea, or more 
aptly the illusion, of a minimalist state was aggressively promoted as the key to ensuring a 
free market based path to prosperity in the developing countries.5 Its extreme emphasis on 
“rolling back the state” consequently paid “very little attention to institutions and the 
complementarity between the private and public spheres of the economy”.6  
However, over the next twenty years, with the growing realisation that such an a- institutional 
thinking on reform would not work in the divergent social-cultural and political contexts of 
                                                 
1 I gratefully acknowledge the helpful critical comments from Professors Stuart Corbridge (Geography), and 
John Harriss (Director, DESTIN), and Dr. James Putzel (Director, DRC)  (all fro m LSE) on an earlier and a 
partial version of this paper. However, I am solely responsible for the omissions and errors in the paper. 
2 Thomas S. Kuhn, ‘Historical Structure of Scientific Discovery’, Science 136:3518 (1962), pp.760-764. 
3 Cited in Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian & Francesco Trebbi,  ‘Institutions Rule: The Primacy Of 
Institutions Over Geography And Integration In Economic Development’, CID Working Paper No. 97, Harvard 
University, 2002, p.1.   
4 Dani Rodrik points out that even the sophisticated Arrow-Debreu mathematical model, with a full set of 
complete and contingent markets extending indefinitely into the future, assumes that property rights are 
protected and contracts enforced. So in the background there exists institutions that establish these; there has to 
be a system of laws and courts to make even ‘perfect’ markets function (‘Development Strategies for the Next 
Century’, paper given at the conference on Developing Economics in the 21 st Century, Institute for Developing 
Economics, Japan. UNU/WIDER, 2000, pp.11-12).  
5 John Gray, ‘The Illusion of a Minimum State’, LSE Public Service Seminar Series, 1997, pp.1-15.  
6 Rodrik (2000), p.2. 
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developing and transition countries, the peculiar cyclic process of knowledge building seems 
to have taken almost a full turn. 7 Resultantly, the primacy of the role of institutions in shaping 
developmental trajectories of such nations is now being reinvented and robustly reargued. 
This has not only resulted in calls such as ‘bringing the state back in,’ or ‘reinvigorating state 
capability’, but has also motivated organizations such as the World Bank to think in terms of 
moving beyond the Washington Consensus.8 The impact of informal socio-cultural 
institutions, such as social networks and participatory institutions, on development has also 
drawn cons iderable attention. 9  
So institutions matter. And if one prefers to go with Rodrik’s findings, the role of institutions 
may appear to triumph over those of geography and integration into the world economy 
(through open trade) in influencing the developmental outcomes of a nation. 10 But the real 
complication starts when one begins to ask questions such as: how much of institutions 
matter? Which institutions, among the many operating in society, have primacy over the 
others in influencing the developmental outcomes under question? What structures or quality 
should they have to be able to effectively promote shared progress in a society? How can we 
know about their causal linkages? How can such quality institutions be acquired, if they are 
absent? Moreover, if acquiring them implies transformation of the historically-given, 
unsupportive, prevailing institutions that are resistant to change, how can that be overcome? 
Bringing institutions back into developmental discourse, notwithstanding their undisputed 
importance and desirability, has not necessarily resulted in clarity around these complex 
issues. The challenge appears to be well recognized by a number of scholars. Reviewing the 
literature on both old and new institutionalism, Nelson and Sampat observe that “there is a 
difficult road ahead before institutions can be weaved into a coherent theory of the 
determinants of economic performance”. 11 Having established that institutions are the key to 
economic development through an exhaustive cross-national study of how geography, trade 
and institutions influence economic development, Rodrik et al. point out, rather ironically, 
that “the operational guidance (for the policymakers who want to improve the performance of 
their economies) that our central result on the primacy of institutional quality yields is 
extremely meagre”. 12 In some of the extreme views on the New Institutional Economy (NIE), 
                                                 
7 Richard R. Nelson & Bhaven N. Sampat also point out that that the surge of new interest in exploring 
institutions’ role in affecting economic performance is a revival of the central concern of Adam Smith and his 
great classical followers (‘Making sense of institutions as a factor shaping economic performance’, Journal of 
Economic Behaviour & Organization , 44 (2001), pp.31-32). Contrast this with those times, as Douglass North  
interestingly reminds us of, when similar assertions on the importance of institutions, coming from the old 
institutionalists, were fast loosing ground to the ascendancy of the neoclassical mainstream economics, and the 
picture of the cyclic turn will be vivid: “But even while the new breed was destroying one traditional explanation 
after another, the traditional historian even in retreat kept muttering over and over, ‘But you are destroying the 
existing myths without replacing them. Soon there will be no explanation - no economic history - just an 
immense heap of numbers’.  And sometimes, plaintively from the left flank of the retreating historians, there 
would come the cry, ‘But institutions ARE important!’” (Douglass North, ‘Institutional Change and Economic 
Development’, The Journal of Economic History, 31:1 (1971), p.118). 
8 Shahid Javed Burki & Guillermo E. Perry, Beyond The Washington Consensus: Institutions Matter, 
Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1998. 
9 David Dunham, ‘States, Reforms and Institutional Change: On the Dynamics of Failure’, paper given at Annual 
Bank Conference on Development Economics, Oslo, 24-26 June 2002, p.2. 
10 Rodrik, et al. (2002); Dani Rodrik, ‘Institutions, Integration, and Geography: In Search of the Deep 
Determinants of Economic Growth’, CID Working Paper, Harvard University, 2002.  
11 Nelson & Sampat (2001), p.32.  
12 See Rodrik, et al. (2002), pp.21-22, who forthrightly observe that their “findings indicate that when investors 
believe their property rights are protected, the economy ends up richer,” but what the “actual form that property 
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it is seen as “more a persuasion or an emphasis”, 13 whose “various branches are united by 
little but common scepticism toward atomistic accounts of social processes and a common 
conviction that institutional arrangements and social processes matter”. 14 
This paper is a modest attempt to engage with the theories and debates on institutions, 
(especially on institutional change) offered by the different traditions working within the 
institutionalist perspective, to assess how helpful they are in unravelling the complex set of 
issues and questions raised above. I discuss four particularly relevant dimensions of an 
institutionalist perspective, in order to unbundle the concept of institutions and institutional 
change, as expressed through the abstract ideas of the structure and the dynamics of ‘rules of 
the game’. In the first section, I briefly discuss the first three issues, which are: (a) 
multiplicity and multi- layering of institutions; (b) institutional arrangement; and (c) 
institutional appropriateness. In the following section, the issue of institutional change is 
examined in some detail. Three broad traditions or strands of the institutionalist perspective, 
namely, (i) Rational Choice Institutionalism, (ii) Historical Institutionalism, and (c) 
Sociological Institutionalism, are explored here, to understand how strategic actions, conflicts 
around asymmetrical power structure in polity and society, and engagements with the 
cultural systems of meaning that pervade all aspects of life and society – respectively the key 
themes or the conceptual constructs of these traditions – help us to understand better why 
‘rules of the game’ evolve and change. The reflections draw attention to the fact that, though 
offering a few useful ideas on institutional development in their own ways, none of them pays 
adequate attention to the role of ideas and agency, and the multi-directional causal 
relationships between them and institutions, which I argue are critical to enriching the 
explanatory scope and depth of an institutionalist mode of inquiry. In the concluding section, I 
offer brief comments to further highlight this problem and offer a few thoughts on some 
possible alternative conceptual constructs that may help to resolve the dilemmas in which 
these traditions are engulfed, and highlight the need of developing and testing them through   
empirical research into cases of institutional change. 
Unpacking ‘Institutions Matter’: Complexities and Challenges 
The most commonly quoted definition of ‘institution’ within the tradition of NIE comes from 
the writings of Douglass North: 
Institutions consist of a set of constraints on behaviour in the form of rules and 
regulations; a set of procedures to detect deviations from the rules and 
regulations; and, finally, a set of moral, ethical behavioural norms which define 
the contours that constrain the way in which the rules and regulations are 
specified and enforcement is carried out.15  
Scholars such as Chang and Evans, Harriss, and Putzel, pick up on the emphasis this view 
places on the constraining role of institutions, and argue that institutions should also be seen 
as providing incentives and playing enabling roles.16 First, it is not clear whether North misses 
                                                                                                                                                        
rights should take,” is neither clear, nor can it be deduced that “private property-rights regime would produce 
superior results compared to alternative forms of property rights.” (emphasis added). 
13 David Brian Robertson, ‘The Return to History and the New Institutionalism in American Political Science’, 
Social Science History, 17:1 (1993), p.2.  
14 Gunnar Grendstad & Per Selle, ‘Cultural Theory and the New Institutionalism’, Journal of Theoretical 
Politics, 7:1 (1995), p.6.  
15 D. North, ‘Transaction Costs, Institutions, and Economic History’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics, 140 (1984), p.8 – emphasis added. 
16 Ha-Joon Chang & Peter Evans, ‘The Role of Institutions in Economic Change’, Paper prepared for the 
meeting of the Other Canon group, Venice, Italy (13 – 14 January 2000), pp.   1-67, at 
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this dimension of institutions, important as it is. His later writing explicitly mentions that 
“[i]nstitutions ...and their enforcement characteristics ...together define the incentive structure 
of societies and specifically economies”. 17 Second, both constraining and enabling roles are 
intertwined, as constraining some actions appears to be inextricably linked to producing 
incentives for shaping and choosing others. Hence, despite making a serious criticism of NIE 
for continuing the rhetoric that “the unconstrained market ...is the natural order”, by 
emphasizing the constraining role of institutions, Chang and Evans are quick in noting that:  
[T]his is, of course, not to say that institutions do not impose constraints. Just 
about all “enabling” institutions involve constraints on some types of behaviour 
by some people.18 
Examples abound: rules that prohibit commuters from driving wrongly in a one-way lane, or 
crossing roads when a stop light is on, also provide incent ives to choose more orderly traffic 
systems. The rules of targeted poverty-reduction programmes provide people living below the 
poverty line with certain welfare-enhancing entitlements, but constrain others from availing of 
them. The institution of caste in India has been viewed as almost entirely constraining in 
nature (prohibiting: occupational mobility, inclusive social interactions, and so on). 
Nonetheless, its political use in mobilising large-scale lower caste-based identity politics 
enabled the balance of power to tilt in favour of the depressed castes – something that had 
remained almost impossible in the previous thousand years of the nation’s history – within a 
short span of fifty years after independence. However, it also constrained the state from 
following universalist approaches in developmental arenas. Thus, not only enabling and 
constraining roles are intertwined, they can untangle differently over time and in relation to 
different issues in a society.  
We must, therefore, move beyond this to bring to the centre the essence of an institutionalist 
perspective. As Hall and Taylor rightly point out, the issues that are fundamental to any 
institutional analysis are “how to construe the relationship between institutions and behaviour 
and how to explain the process whereby institutions originate or change”. 19 In exploring 
these, one can keep both the constraining and enabling roles of institutions in mind, but which 
of them is more relevant for the analysis at hand can only be inquired empirically, and cannot 
be settled a priori. These fundamental issues, however, when viewed through abstract and 
generic concepts of formal and informal rules that contextualize and influence human 
behaviour in shaping societal outcomes, do not help to visualize a range of complexities 
associated with an institutionalist perspective. In order to deepen our understanding of the 
fundamental issues, broadly speaking four analytical components require close examination: 
(a) multiplicity and multi- layering of institutions; (b) a dynamic hierarchical relationship of 
influence between them, or institutional arrangements; (c) institutional appropriateness, i.e., 
what type of institution or institutional hierarchy is appropriate for the welfare-enhancing 
societal outcomes under question; and (d) institutional change. A brief discussion on the first 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/faculty/chang/c&e-pdf.pdf; John Harriss, ‘Institutions, Politics and Culture: A Case 
for “Old” Institutionalism in the Study of Historical Change’, DESTIN Working Paper Series No.02-34, 2002, 
p.1 f.n.2; James Putzel, ‘Accounting for the dark side of social capital’, Journal of International Development, 
9:7 (1997), pp.939-949, cited in Crisis States Programme, ‘Concepts and Research Agenda’, Crisis States 
Working Paper No.1, London: Development Research Centre, LSE, 2001, p.3, f.n.3. 
17 Douglass C. North, ‘Economic Performance Through Time’, American Economic Review, 84:3 (1994), 
pp.359-60 – emphasis added.  
18 Chang & Evans (2000), p.8. 
19 Peter A. Hall & Rosemary C. R. Taylor, ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, Discussion 
Paper 96/6, Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, 1996, p.6.  
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three issues follows in the next subsection, and the last issue, the most vexed of all, is 
discussed in some detail in the following sub-section. 
 
The issue of layers, hierarchy and appropriateness  
1.  Multiplicity and multi-layering of institutions  
A wide range of rules operate in a society, i.e., multiple institutions (economic, political, 
socio-cultural, and so on) exist. They also operate at different layers of state and society. For 
example, rules that govern political interactions – political institutions – operate at macro, 
meso, and micro levels of a society. The constitution of a country sets out the rules that define 
the macro framework of political interactions (democratic or authoritarian; parliamentary or 
presidential; separation of executive, legislative and judicial functions, etc.). The detailed 
rules (including informal) – for example, the ways elections are conducted, political parties 
recruit their members and compete with each other, and political executives work in different 
state organizations – demonstrate the workings of the political institutions at the meso level. 
And the rules that guide the interactions of voters with the political parties and their 
candidates – for example, patron-clientalism, the caste system (in India), and religious 
symbolisms – reveal the micro layer of political institutions operative at the deeper level of a 
society. The outcomes under question, such as political participation of the low caste poor in 
India, can be varyingly influenced by rules operative at these different layers. The macro rules 
may be well designed, but their effective translation into reality may be seriously hindered if 
the micro layer rules are such that they debilitate the poor from participating in elections and 
other political processes.  But depending upon how the rules at the meso- level work, this 
outcome can vary again.  
2.  Institutional arrangements 
At the same time, a certain interrelatedness between, or a hierarchical structure of, different 
institutions (with their internal layered structures and their hierarchy of influence as well), 
also matters in shaping the influence of a particular institution on certain outcomes of concern 
in a society. To return to the example discussed above: the issue of the exclusion of the low 
caste poor from political participation in India can be viewed as resulting from the social-
cultural institutions such as the caste system. But economic institutions such as the regressive 
agrarian structure (highly skewed land ownership; semi-feudal mode of production with 
practices of attached and bonded labour) appear to matter too, in so far as they structure a 
subservient relationship between the low caste poor and landed forward castes that privileges 
the latter in controlling the political processes in their areas. Absence or presence of 
institutionalised left-of-centre, or even ‘ultra left’, political parties, driven by their respective 
rules of the game for political mobilisation of the poor, appear influential as well. Robust and 
impartial government institutions and organisations (election commissions; rule bound and 
‘well-capacitated’ bureaucracy, especially the lower bureaucracy) can mediate by providing 
protection to the poor in times of voting at the booths and affect the outcomes. Which of the 
set of formal and informal rules pertaining to socio-cultural (caste system), economic 
(agrarian structure), political (party structure), and governmental institutions matters more in 
producing the nature of (non)participation of the poor in politics, for example, in voting? 
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Deciphering the chain of causality between different types and layers of institutions to trace 
their impact on outcomes has not been easy. 20  
This issue is made more complicated when reverse causality is recognized to be at work that 
leads to a dynamic (changing) nature of such a hierarchy over time. Much “cross-national 
empirical work on institution[s] has been plagued by the endogeneity of institutional 
variables”. Questions such as, “are rich countries rich because they have high-quality 
institutions, or the other way around?” easily illustrate the dilemma in the inquiry.21 
Hirschman demonstrates this insightfully too, when he points out the “on-and-off” 
connection, or a coupling and decoupling, between economic and political institutions in 
advancing democracy and economic progress.22  
3.  Institutional appropriateness 
The proposition that institutions matter is of concern for the following two subsets of 
propositions, especially from a policy perspective: (a) there are certain institutional 
arrangements that help to achieve welfare-enhancing ends in a society; and (b) certain other 
institutional arrangements not only hinder processes of achieving such desirable ends, but also 
resist introduction of, or transformation by, welfare-enhancing institutions. 
However, there is no theory to let us deduce ex-ante what would be an appropriate design of 
an institutional arrangement in a society that can promote societal welfare. On the other hand, 
defining the appropriateness ex-post runs the danger of being tautological,23 besides posing 
the challenge for its generalization beyond the specific context within which it worked.  
Take, for example, the case of institutional arrangements that provide protection of property 
rights. What is widely believed is that entrepreneurs’ sense of security about the returns they 
get from their ventures through the protection of the property rights they enjoy, inter alia, is a 
                                                 
20 See Johannes Jütting, ‘Institutions and Development: A Critical Review’, OECD Technical Papers, No. 210, 
2003, that reviews a large number of cross-national statistical and case study-based researches on institutional 
issues and highlights this as a major challenge in the institutional analysis.  
21 Rodrik (2002), p.8. See also, in the same article, Fig 3 on p. 27 that depicts the multidirectional causality, and 
the problem of endogeneity, between trade, institutions, and other growth variables. However, a recent and much 
cited work by Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson (‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development: An Empirical Investigation’, American Economic Review, 91:5 (2001), pp.1369-1401) claimed to 
isolate a truly exogenous institutional variable that can robustly account for the growth differentials among 
different countries. The central argument in this article is interesting: settler mortality rate due to the varying 
levels of prevalence of disease in colonies where Europeans migrated to induced patterns in their settlement and 
institutional quality of states formed. Where they settled in large numbers such as in ‘Neo-Europes’ (prime 
examples: Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States), they replicated European institutions with 
strong emphasis on private property and checks against government power. But, in places where the disease 
environment was not favorable, ‘extractive states’ (such as Congo), lacking in these features, were set up 
primarily to transfer maximum possible resources of the colony to the colonizer.  These differences in the 
institutional qualities of the states have persisted since the colonial times and explain well the growth 
differentials between them in the present.  See also Rodrik, et al. (2002), who refute this argument (taking a 
much larger sample of 163 countries, which included 60 such countries that were never colonized), on grounds 
of: (a) model’s incapacity to explain similar growth differentials in non-colonized countries; and (b) not directly 
resting the impact of colonial policies and institutions on income, and thus loading a larger than merited causal 
story on an otherwise plausible statistical instrument such as settler mortality to identify the causal relationship 
between institutional quality and income levels.  
22 Albert Hirschman, ‘The On-and-Off connection between Political and Economic Progress’, American 
Economic Review, 84:2 (1994), pp.343-348. 
23 See Jütting (2003). Harriss (2002), p.2, also draws attention to this issue while discussing Nugent’s ideas on 
NIE.  
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must for the development of markets.24 But there is no fixed design of institutional 
arrangements that can provide this function effectively. The classic case is of China, where 
Township and Village Enterprises (TVE), which represented an intermediate form of 
ownership between private and state ownership (i.e., local community ownership) not in 
conformity with the blueprint of the ‘best practice’ institutions usually modelled on those 
prevalent in the US and other advanced industrial nations,25 is said to have spurred 
entrepreneurial activity.26 Contrast this with the case of India, where private property rights 
were far more secure in colonial times, and after independence as well, through legislative 
enactments, and were well protected by the judiciary in both periods. But, as Clark and 
Westcott revealingly demonstrate, the Indian case represents a paradox as, notwithstanding 
this favourable institutional underpinning of the economy, India not only remained one of the 
poorer countries in the world, but also experienced falling per capita income relative to both 
Britain and the USA between 1873 and 1987.27  
                                                 
24 Douglass C. North & Robert Paul Thomas, ‘An Economic Theory of the Growth of the Western World’, The 
Economic History Review, 23:1 (1970), pp.1-17; Rodrik, et al (2002); Acemoglu, et al. (2001) – see f.n.21 
above; and many others categorically endorse this proposition, especially in the context of the rise of the West 
(in terms of modern economic growth), the essence of which is that: “an entrepreneur does not have the incentive 
to accumulate and innovate unless s/he has adequate control over the return to the assets that are thereby 
produced or improved” (Rodrik 2000, p.5). And, of course, the ‘final’ argument comes from De Soto (The Other 
Path, New York: Harper, 1989), who, as Boettke describes,  “points out that in his youth while it was common 
for everyone to assert that property was held in common, when he and his friends would wander near a home the 
dog on that land would growl and bark to keep them away. The dog knew, de Soto points out, that the home 
belonged to his owner. The punch-line to de Soto’s story is that he predicts that the countries that will succeed in 
the 21st century will be those that formally recognize what the dogs already knew” (Peter J. Boettke, ‘The New 
Comparative Political Economy’, Forum Series on the Role of Institutions in Promoting Economic Growth, 
Directed by the Mercatus Center at George Mason University and the IRIS Center Sponsored by USAID, 2003, 
p.28). 
25 Usually viewed as comprising of: secure private property rights protected by the rule of law; impartial 
enforcement of contracts through an independent judiciary; appropriate government regulations to foster market 
competition; effective corporate governance; and transparent financial systems. 
26 Yingyi Quian observes: “The most important segment of local government firms are Township-Village 
Enterprises (TVEs) in rural areas, which numbered 1.5 million with employment of 52 million in 1993. The TVE 
shares of output and employment in rural industry were 72 percent and 58 percent respectively, the rest being 
private shares” (‘How Reform Worked in China’, Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of 
California, Berkeley, 2002, pp.19-20).  See also Yingyi Qian, ‘The Process of China's Market Transition (1978-
98): The Evolutionary, Historical, and Comparative Perspectives’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics, 156:1 (2000), pp.151-171.  
27 See Gregory Clark & Susan Wolcott, ‘Why Nations Fail: Managerial Decisions and Performance in Indian 
Cotton Textiles 1890-1938’, Journal of Economic History. 59:2 (1999), pp.97-123; and Gregory Clark & Susan 
Wolcott, ‘One Polity, Many Countries: Economic Growth in India, 1873-2000’, in Dani Rodrik (ed.), In Search 
of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. In the 
latter article, they demonstrate that that Indian per capita income continued to fall relative to USA and Great 
Britain for a long period from 1873 till 1987. The erosion in income during the colonial period was, authors 
observe, a great 20th century paradox since “from an economist’s perspective the institutional environment in the 
colonialist years from 1873-1947 – secure property rights, free trade, fixed exchange rates, and open capital 
markets – was close to ideal.” Even later, the institutional structure viewed central to promoting growth (secure 
property rights) did not vary. Based on an intensive study of textile industries of India, they speculate a 
provocative answer to this paradox. The problem, they suggest, lay not in a deficit of institutional arrangements 
or polices, but in the peculiar employer-employee relationship that debilitated the Indian industries from 
employing technology more profitably. Elaborating on this, they observe that in productive economies, workers 
exert more effort in the workplace than can be justified purely by monitoring or by direct financial incentives 
because they expect everyone else to act in that manner, thus, a condition of mutual gift-giving equilibrium. In 
the Indian (textile) industries, on the contrary, everybody shirks, as they expect nobody to exert more, thus, a 
condition of mutual-shirking equilibrium. 
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However, with the Indian economy growing between 5 and 6% annually since economic 
reforms were initiated in 1991, the view has been advanced that the nature of the state also 
matters. The Indian state lacked developmental features that the East Asian countries 
possessed, which had secured them shared progress. But when institutional features of the 
well-known developmental states are examined, more questions than answers arise. The 
influential study of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry’s (MITI) role in Japan’s 
development presented to the world the idea of the developmental state as:  
a weberian ideal type of an interventionist state that was neither socialist (a plan-
irrational state .....) nor free-market..... but something different: the plan-rational 
capitalist developmental state, conjoining private ownership with state guidance.28  
A number of important studies on East Asian developmental states (especially South Korea 
and Taiwan) furthered this concept.29 Following Chang and Evans, who have in their recent 
papers revisited this concept in the case of South Korea (in the context of the recent Asian 
financial crisis), the institutional elements of the Korean developmental state appear to be: 
meritocratic bureaucracy; powerful ministry with planning and budgetary functions; close 
coordination with business conglomerates (chaebols); start of five-year plans; nationalization 
of the banks; and semi-public agencies to help business, such as the state trading agency. 30  
Almost all of these elements were present in significantly comparable ways, and possibly 
more robustly, in the Indian State, especially in the pre-liberalization period: a strong 
meritocratic bureaucracy bequeathed by the British that was nurtured and further strengthened 
after independence;31 a vibrant Planning Commission, building up five year plans early on 
with top economists in command additionally strengthened by the aura and the authority of 
the Prime Minister being its Chairman;32 nationalized banks; different formal (FICCI, CII)33 
                                                 
28 M. Woo-Cumings, ‘Introduction: Chalmers Johnson and the Politics of Nationalism and Development’, in M. 
Woo-Cumings (ed.), The Developmental State , Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999, p.1. 
29 See among others A. Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989; P. Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1995; and R. Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of 
Government in Taiwan's Industrialization , Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990. 
30 Chang and Evans (2000), pp.22-24. See also Ha-Joon Chang, ‘An Institutionalist Perspective on the Role of 
the State: Towards an Institutionalist Political Economy’, in L. Burlamaqui, A. Castro & H-J. Chang (eds), 
Institutions and the Role of the State, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000, pp.3-26; and Ha -Joon Chang, ‘Industrial 
Policy and East Asia: The Miracle, the Crisis, and the Future’, a revised version of the paper presented at the 
World Bank workshop on Re-thinking East Asian Miracle, San Francisco, 16-17 February 1999. 
31 For an insightful account of how the British colonizers formed a robust bureaucratic institution in India during 
colonial times, and how the basic structure and culture survived even after independence, see Potter (1996). 
From what Chang and Evans (2000) describe of the bureaucracy of South Korea, it may appear that the Indian 
bureaucracy had a much longer history of meritocracy and also greater competence. Quoting T. Cheng, S. 
Haggard & D. Kang, ‘Institutions and Growth in Korea and Taiwan: The Bureaucracy’, Journal of Development 
Studies, 34:6 (1998), p.105, they observe that: “The bureaucracy was nominally organized along a meritocratic 
line, but the practice was such that between 1949 and 1961, only 336 passed the High Civil Service 
Examination, compared to the 8,263 who got government jobs through ‘special appointments’. The quality of the 
bureaucracy was such that, until the late 1960s, several years after the civil service reform by the new military 
government was started, Korean bureaucrats  were being sent to countries like Pakistan and the Philippines for 
extra training.”  Note that Pakistan had exactly the same legacy of the institution that India had, and as it was 
training the Korean bureaucrats till late 1960s , it will not be unfair to imagine that the Indian bureaucratic 
institution was superior to that of S. Korea.  
32 Note that only after the coup by General Park Chung Hee in 1961, the Economic Planning Board, with both 
planning and budgetary authorities, came into existence in S. Korea, and began to formulate the five-year plans 
thereafter. India, on the other hand had set up the Planning Commission almost 11 years before, and by the 
1960s, the country was well entrenched with the planned development process. 
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and informal groups of powerful industrialists with close linkages to the Finance and Industry 
Ministries; a tradition of laying out comprehensive Industrial Polices, framed in close 
collaboration with the big private players, offering directions and incentives for private 
investments; and a plethora of semi-public agencies, such as Export Promotion Councils and 
Trading  Corporations, to help business.  
Yet the Indian economy is said to have improved only after, if you may, the ‘Indian 
developmental state’ had been made less interventionist and regulatory. On the other hand, 
comparable features of the East Asian states have been viewed as the driving force behind the 
famed developmental miracles that they achieved. One may go into the finer details to argue 
that perhaps the comparison is not accurate (I will return to this in the following section). But 
when one learns that the much acclaimed developmental state of South Korea and its 
industrial polices were, after all, not so good, as they eventually created conditions that led to 
the recent financial crisis experienced by this and other states in East Asia, and subsequently 
confront the counter analysis that the crisis occurred not because of, but by the abandonment 
of, this very developmental state, the puzzle returns.34  
The list can be long. There are raging debates, with unceasingly shifting positions discovering 
and rediscovering values of one institution over another, on just about any finding on what the 
appropriate institutions or institutional arrangements are that can kick the developing 
countries out of the low-equilibrium trap, and enable them to catch up with the advanced 
nations. Unsurprisingly, therefore, in the midst of this some provocative and engaging 
arguments are also advanced that the prescriptions of good institutions emanating from the 
advanced nations for the developing countries, in fact amount to ‘kicking away the ladder’ by 
the former, that had helped them reach where they now are: 
In terms of institutional development, until they were quite developed (say, until 
the early 20th century), the developed countries had very few of the institutions 
deemed essential for developing countries today, democratic political institutions, 
a professional bureaucracy, and the central bank. Indeed, when they were 
developing countries themselves, the developed countries had much lower-quality 
institutions than today’s developing countries at comparable levels of 
development.35 
And when an eminent Nobel Laureate such as Stiglitz also alerts us, echoing heresy and 
unorthodoxy as we have noted above, to “think twice before dismissing the deputies’ doubts 
as populist rants” (as against “technocratic proposals”), since “perhaps the populists are 
popular because they know something that the technocrats don’t,”36 scepticism abounds. 
What, then, should be the reference points against which institutions in the developing 
countries need to be understood in terms of their appropriateness or disfunctionality for 
facilitating welfare-enhancing societal outcomes? How to construe them ex-ante and 
endogenously, if exogenously drawn templates do not hold or should be avoided? And how, 
without establishing the end point before beginning the journey of institutional reform 
(however short or piecemeal), we can even chart out a trajectory of a forward movement? 
                                                                                                                                                        
33 FICCI: The Federation of the Indian Cambers of Commerce and Industry. CII: Confederation of Indian 
Industries. 
34 See this debate in Chang & Evans (2000), Chang (1999), and a detailed critical treatment in Chang (2000). 
35 Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective, London: Anthem 
Press, 2002, p.1.  
36 Joseph E. Stiglitz, ‘Populists Are Sometimes Right’, Project Syndicate (June 2003), at http://www.project-
syndicate.cz/commentaries/commentary_text.php4?id=1234&lang=1&m=contributor, p.1.  
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There may be an emerging sober consensus in this regard that argues in favour of 
“experimentation (and) willingness to depart from orthodoxy”, and asserts that: 
‘good’ institutions ...must often have elements that are highly specific to a 
country's circumstances.... institutional reform that ignores the role of local 
variation and institutional innovation is at best inadequate, and at worse 
harmful.37  
Nevertheless, we still need to tackle the questions raised above. After all, even a trial-and-
error approach (perhaps simpler than experimentation, innovation, and engineering) needs 
some mental maps about a few, if not all, of the steps ahead. It may sound blind, but it is 
never so in reality. Or are we stuck with the idea of ‘changing the rules of the game’, when 
the trick lies in ‘playing the rules of the game differently’? 
 
What do the Institutionalists know about Institutional Change? 
We are already beginning to get some clues about the even greater complexity involved in 
unbundling the concept of institutional change, to which in this section I now turn. I propose 
to briefly and critically reflect upon the arguments of Chang and Evans, Grindle, Hall and 
Taylor, Pierson, and Pierson and Skocpol on institutional change, as these are based on an 
extensive critical survey of a large amount of literature relating to institutionalism of different 
shades.38 These authors offer varying classifications of work within the institutionalist 
tradition. However, it appears that they broadly comprise three themes of emphasis, which I 
briefly discuss: efficiency in exchange, therefore choice matters; conflict around power, 
therefore history matters; and culture, therefore worldview matters.  
1.  Efficiency in exchange, therefore choice matters  
Ronald Coase, whose famous work on “The Nature of the Firm” is said to have initiated the 
school of New Institutional Economics by introducing the notion of transaction costs in 
economic analysis, in a scathing attack on the mainstream economists comments: 
[E]conomists think of themselves as having a box of tools but no subject matter.  
It reminds me of two lines from a modern poet...: I see the bridle and the bit all 
right. But where’s the bloody horse.39   
The “bloody horse”, the subject matter of economics, according to Coase, is the flow of goods 
and services in the real world and how they can be made more productive for the benefit of 
mankind. This in turn depends on exchange relationships involving transaction costs, i.e., 
                                                 
37 Rodrik (2002), pp.13 & 15. 
38 Chang & Evans (2000), pp.2-18; Hall & Taylor (1996); Mirilee S. Grindle, ‘In Quest of the Political: The 
Political Economy of Development Policy Making’, CID Working Paper No. 17, Harvard University, 1999; Paul 
Pierson, ‘Explaining Institutional Origins and Change’, 2001, draft chapter from Politics in Time: History, 
Institutions and Social Analysis, manuscript in progress, at http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~pierson/ch4.pdf ; 
and Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science’, in Ira 
Katznelson and Helen Milner (eds), Political Science: The State of the Discipline, New York & London: Norton, 
2002, pp.1-32. They present their assessments of different institutionalist schools. I primarily draw upon the 
synthesized accounts as presented by the authors mentioned above, and do not separately discuss the contents of 
the source materials they rely upon.  
39 Though Ronald Coase is himself modest about it and gives credit to Williamson for coining this term in order 
to differentiate from, what he describes, anti-theoretical works of old institutionalists (‘The New Institutional 
Economics’, The American Economic Review, 88:2 (1998), pp.72-74).  
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costs involved in acquiring information, enforcing exchange rules, and managing risks.40 The 
lower these costs, the more efficient the exchange, and the greater the productivity of the 
system.  
This underlying fundamental thought under NIE views institutional creation and change as 
driven by rational actors’ ongoing pursuits of optimization of efficiency that are aimed at 
lowering transaction costs in their (market) exchange relationships for maximizing their 
wealth. But what if potentially efficiency-enhancing institutions are not found in existence? 
The classic rationalist explanation to account for this anomaly suggests reducing “transactions 
costs (thus bringing up more efficient institutions), that tend to be subject to economies of 
scale,” becoming feasible only when a “larger potential market makes it worth while to 
acquire information which would have been unprofitable in a very small market”. For 
example, policing of piracy or brigandage for improving information and reducing 
externalities were secured only after market growth made such institution-building a 
profitable venture.41 
However, in political spheres, the “rational choice institutionalism”, as Hall and Taylor 
demonstrate, views emergence, persistence and change of institutions as the means to solve 
collective action dilemmas (such as, the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ and the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’). In this, a more generic view of transaction costs in exchanges is taken to cover a 
ubiquitous large domain of non-market interactions in a society: 
Institutions structure such interactions by affecting the range and sequence of 
alternatives on the choice-agenda or by providing information and enforcement 
mechanisms that reduce uncertainty about the corresponding behaviour of others 
and allow ‘gains from exchange,’ thereby leading actors toward particular 
calculations and potentially better social outcomes.42  
Self-evidently, a highly functionalist view such as this predictably comes under sharp attack 
by many scholars. Empirically it is challenged by pointing out an abundance of existing and 
persisting inefficient institutions in the real world (even when replacing them with potential 
efficient alternatives is considered to be profitable or capable of better solving collective 
action dilemmas). But theoretically the view is seen as flawed as well, since it assumes 
rational actors’ incredible capacity to indulge in “‘meta-optimization’ exercises involving 
both resource costs and decision-making costs (or transaction costs)”, when they “are not 
even capable of doing the standard optimization exercise involving only resource costs”,43 
due to their ‘bounded rationality’.44 These apart, attention is brought to problems of “self-
reinforcing mechanisms of socially suboptimal institutions” leading to what is known as path 
dependence,45 and of unintended consequences for institutions (the latter long recognised,46 
                                                 
40 Following North & Thomas (1970), pp.5-6, who define it as “costs of externalities, of information, and of 
risk”. 
41 North & Thomas (1970), pp.5-.8. 
42 Hall & Taylor (1996), p.12. 
43 Chang & Evans (1999), pp.11-12. 
44 The concept comes from Herbert A. Simon, Models of bounded rationality, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1982. 
45 See, among others, Pranab Bardhan, ‘Understanding Underdevelopment: Challenges for Institutional 
Economics from the Poor Country Perspective’, Villa Borsig Workshop Series 2000 - The Institutional 
Foundations of a Market Economy, 2000, pp.6-7; Harriss (2002), pp.3-4; Grindle (1999); and Chang & Evans 
(2000), pp.12-13.  
46 See Bardhan (2000), who draws attention to Menger’s insightful work (Problems of Economics and Sociology, 
translated by F. J. Nock, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1963 [1883]) that distinguished between: 
“‘pragmatic’ institutions – the direct outcome of conscious contractual design, as in the institutional models in 
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but rather naively ignored by rational choice institutionalists), to demonstrate the inefficacy of 
this view.  
In line with these, but with some valuable additional insights, a recent work by Pierson also 
brings up the issues of: multiplicity of effects (other than those institutions were designed 
for); non- instrumentality (actors may be motivated more by conceptions of what they believe 
to be appropriate than by conceptions of what would be effective); short-time horizon; rapid 
environmental change (altering the parameters on which institutions were shaped); actor 
discontinuity (actors inheriting institutions may have different interests and motivations than 
those who founded them); and, of course, the unanticipated consequences, that seriously 
challenge the functionalist (or actor-centred functionalist) view discussed above. Pierson also 
takes issue with the idea of institutional learning and competition, modelled on what 
Williamson has argued for the economic sphere,47 as inadequate to remedy these by providing 
for a cumulative process of institutional enhancement. The greater complexity of political 
interactions and difficulties posed by institutional resilience (the latter arising most 
significantly from asset specificity constraints),48 are said to limit the possibilities of 
institutional corrections and enhancements through learning processes and feedback 
mechanisms in the socio-political spheres of life.  
So what should we make of all this? The reliance on the ‘calculus of rationality’ of actors (a 
la Peter and Hall) suggested by this school undermines an understanding of the complex 
dynamics of change in society, much of which is the story of institutional change. For some 
scholars, this weakness is of an extreme kind. They therefore suggest that NIE, and by 
extension rational choice institutionalism, is vacuous as a theory of institutional change.49 
Others point towards the need of bringing an inter-temporal perspective in studying politics,50 
and enriching the thin rationality assumption. 51 Let me therefore turn to the historical 
institutionalist tradition, which claims to deal with the question of change through an 
historical perspective much better. 
                                                                                                                                                        
the theory of imperfect information or transaction cost – and “organic” institutions – comparatively undesigned 
and evolving gradually as the unintended and unforeseeable result of the pursuit of individual interests” 
(Bardhan, 2000, p.6).   
47 Oliver E. Williamson makes the classic rational choice argument in favour of institutional enhancement by 
suggesting that “the ‘far-sighted propensity’ or ‘rational spirit’ would work on the feedback and fold them into 
the organisational design in ways to improve overall efficiency” (‘Transaction Cost Economics and Organization 
Theory’, Industrial and Corporate Change, 2 (1993), pp.116-117; cited in Pierson (2001), p.25). 
48 The key point about asset specificity concept (this note primarily draws upon Pierson, 2001), that is due to 
Williamson, is that investments are made over historical periods in certain physical, intellectual, and relational 
‘specific assets’ assuming the presence of particular institutions. This in turn engenders strong interest in the 
holders of these assets to preserve them, and thus causes institutional resilience, as those assets could make the 
institutions serve the interests of the holders more efficiently vis-à-vis  alternative institutions. Gourevitch 
insightfully brings out the importance of this concept in politics: “Political actors develop investments, ‘specific 
assets,’ in a particular arrangement – relationships, expectations, privileges, knowledge of procedures, all tied to 
the institution at work. Where investments in the specific assets of an institution are high actors will find the cost 
of any institutional change that endangers these assets to be quite high; indeed, actors in this situation may be 
reluctant to run risks of any change at all” (Peter Alexis Gourevitch, ‘The Governance Problem in International 
Relations’, in David Lake and Robert Powell (eds.), Strategic Choice and International Relations, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000, pp.144-145, cited in Pierson, 2001, p.42).  This is a very useful concept, and 
can relate well to the real world cases. 
49 Harriss (2002), p.5. 
50 Pierson (2001), p.52. 
51 Hall & Taylor (1996), p.18. 
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2.  Conflict around power, therefore, history matters  
Rather than taking a snapshot view of political processes when the ‘dust has settled’ (as the 
rational intuitionalists do), Historical Institutionalism claims to offer, “substantive 
enlightenment… about the social structures in which we are enmeshed and which largely 
condition the course of our lives”, 52 through exploring how the dust goes about settling.53 
How do the historical institutionalists go about doing this? It is difficult to pinpoint a core set 
of generic analytical constructs that this school of thought employs in their investigations due 
to their strongly held belief that specificity and context matters; thus theories can at best, and 
should, be of “middle range generalisations,” at the level of the “eclectic messy centre”,54 
rather than grand and all encompassing.  
However, substantive agendas, temporal arguments, and attention to contexts and 
configurations are the key themes that distinguish it from the other schools of thought 
working on understanding institutions.55 Because of this, multiple macro-historical structures 
(in the sense of large and complex institutions), their interactions over an extended time 
period and their sequence, and conjunctures that join even those structures and processes that 
may be evolving historically separately, rather than individuals, are at the centrestage of the 
analysis. And often these macro-structures and their processes are viewed “as developing 
products of struggle among unequal actors” around “uneasy balances of power and resources” 
that they embody. 56 Hence, scholars working in this tradition view that institutions mirror 
asymmetries of power in a society between different groups and collectivities, and persist for 
all the wrong reasons already discussed,57 due to this very asymmetry; but also ultimately 
change due to conditions of challenge, contestation and conflict surrounding the skewed 
control of resources and decision-making processes that this asymmetry gives rise to. But 
even when the struggle for altering the power balance is ‘settled in one round’, the dust does 
not, as: 
new sources of conflict, new claims for resources, new spaces for contestation, or 
efforts by various collectivities to undo the impact of the new institutions on their 
claims to power and influence (arise)... Political actors would reorganize, 
recombine, or reassert themselves to take advantage of new resources or reclaim 
lost ones; they would re-connect in conflict, coalition building, and bargaining 
over the distributional consequences of change, probably with reconfigured 
access to political, economic, and leadership resources.58 
 
There is no doubt that paying close attention to the historical narratives of power, conflicts 
around control of resources and decision-making for their uses, and socio-political 
mobilizations and movements; and deciphering their underlying processes and patterns, 
provide a thick account of institutional development. Thus, unravelling large historical events 
such as revolutions in certain historical epochs, regime transformations across the world, the 
                                                 
52 Lewis Coser had viewed this as the “supreme test of social science” (‘Presidential Address: Two Methods in 
Search of a Substance’, American Sociological Review, 40 (1975), p.698, cited in Pierson & Skocpol (2002), 
p.4). 
53 H. Peyton Young, Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998, cited in Pierson (2001), p.1. 
54 See a persuasive discussion by Evans of why this is preferable in theory building in Kohli et al., ‘The Role 
Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium’, World Politics, 48:1 (1996), pp.2-6.  
55 Pierson & Skocpol (2002), p.3. 
56 These are based on Pierson & Skocpol (2002), p.12. 
57 See the discussions on rational choice institutionalism in the text. 
58 Grindle (1999), p.11. 
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rise of backward castes and classes, long term conflicts between groups or nations, and the 
like, require analysis of multiple institutions and their interactive processes that evolve over 
decades, or even centuries. But this thickened account, often undertaken to challenge and 
replace the thin rationality assumptions, generally removes the actor or the agents from the 
scene as well, as if they do not matter to the dynamics of these historical constructs that shape 
deeper institutional changes in a society.  
Individuals do enter into the equation and make a difference, by producing and seizing upon 
ideas; changing world views; and redefining and symbolizing what is just and not just, what is 
honourable and what is not, what are desirable collective goods and what are not. They equate 
their definitions of personal attainment and striving in life with these social visions and 
causes. They take enormous risks in their lives when they choose to follow new ideas, 
redefinitions of the ‘just order’, and new meanings of dignity and honour amidst the darkest 
uncertainties about their outcomes. They may perish in the process, but if they succeed that 
can trigger chain reactions among their fellow beings that, through a complex process of 
aggregation over time and space, engender the very dynamics of large historical constructs 
that are dear to the historical institutionalists.  
These interventions are far different from those conceived in the rationalist school, where 
either maximizing wealth (economic actors), or rents (bureaucrats), or personal political 
power (politicians) are the only generic forms of contributions that are assigned to actors. 
Historical institutionalists who challenge this should have all the more reason to look not only 
for thicker accounts of macro-structures and processes, but also for alternative and richer 
accounts of generic individuals preferences. In fine combing the historical details for 
discovering their deep layers of sequences, patterns, and causalities, they need also to look for 
how such a broader set of generic preferences gets culturally and historically shaped, and 
expressed over time; most importantly, how, despite those structurations, they enable 
continual reflections on, and reinterpretations of, contexts, institutions, culture, and their 
histories to eventually lead to – or, following Kuhn, make quantum jumps to –  changes in the 
world views and institutions of a society. This, I submit, can only be possible if individuals 
with thin rationality are replaced, and not removed, in the analytical schema of historical 
institutionalism by conceptions of individuals working with a larger set of preferences, 
generic in form, cultural in content, and deliberative in dynamics. 
In certain types of analysis, where relatively more abstract historical constructs, such as 
revolution that by definition are products of a long term and a complex historical process,59 
are the subject matter of explanation this problem may not be acute (although it does not 
vanish). But, when one peeps into what is happening when the dust has settled, even 
temporarily (as in how revolutionary regimes are delivering the promised dream of 
development or justice to their citizens), the absence of agents from the analysis creates 
serious difficulties. These difficulties, inter alia, concern two sets of issues: causality issues in 
linking macro and micro; and mistaken conflation of layers and types of institutions.  
I return to my discussion of the developmental state in the context of South Korea and India 
to illustrate this. The apparent puzzle of divergent economic performance in these two 
countries, notwithstanding the similarities in the structural features of their developmental 
states, can be understood in terms of differentials in their institutional underpinnings.60  
                                                 
59 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China , 
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979.  
60 I am thankful to Dr. James Putzel for drawing my attention to this aspect by his comments on an earlier and a 
partial version of this paper. 
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Scholars argue that large-scale land reforms, expansion in health and education, and support 
to agriculture in South Korea helped to substantially mitigate asymmetries in the rural power 
structure (and consequently the distributional conflicts), and thus provided a supportive 
institutional foundation to the developmental state to blatantly focus on promoting growth-
promoting policies.61 But why were these foundations and the shaping of a developmental 
state pushed, when the state power structure continued to be dominated by the wealthy elites, 
who could have, as in other developing countries, enjoyed rents from the existing national pie 
rather than labouring hard to increase its size?62  Scholars provide interesting insights to 
unravel this issue. They argue that there was a credible and robust threat to the survival of the 
ruling elite in power from internal (threat of rural populace embracing communism) and 
external sources, and that this was the determining factor that drove the ruling elites to follow 
a path of shared progress seriously.63  
This is an important insight. It does help to show why a ruling elite might be oriented towards 
establishing and activating a developmental state. But such historical causation does not 
explain the subsequent activities, the nuts-and-bolts that the developmental state employs to 
achieve the desired ends, such as: how choices from among a set of alternatives are made to 
define ‘a path’ to shared progress (policies, strategies of implementation, and the like);64 and 
how within the overall institutional underpinnings to the state’s functioning, new meso-level 
rules are constructed and enforced to support the transition of the state and society to the 
chosen path. 65 The final outcomes for the society depend on the nature of both the orientation 
                                                 
61 Irma Adelamn, ‘Social Development in Korea, 1953-1993’, at http://are.berkeley.edu/~adelman/KOREA.html; 
James Putzel, ‘Developmental States and Crony Capitalists’, in P. Massina (ed.), Rethinking Development in 
East Asia: From Illusory Miracle to Economic Crisis, Richmond: Curzon Press, 2002, pp.189-222. 
62 See Robinson’s theory of predatory states (Theories of ‘Bad Policy’ Los Angeles: University of Southern 
California, 1995), which, as Bardhan describes, demonstrates that “it may not be rational for a dictator, for 
example, to carry out institutional changes that safeguard property rights, law enforcement, and other 
economically beneficial structures, even though they may fatten the cow the dictator has the power to milk, if 
such change can damage or weaken his pre-existing rent-extraction machinery. The dictator may not risk 
upsetting the current arrangement for the uncertain prospect of a share in a larger pie” (Bardhan, 2000, p.8). 
Robinson’s arguments are quite similar to the asset specificity issue earlier discussed (see f.n.48).  
63 Putzel (2002), p.11. E. Campos & H. L. Root observe that: “In contrast with Latin America and Africa, East 
Asian regimes established their legitimacy by promising shared growth so that demands of narrowly conceived 
groups for regulations that would have long-term deleterious consequences for growth were resisted. In 
particular, broad-based social support allowed their governments to avoid having to make concessions to radical 
demands of organized labor” (The Key to the East Asian Miracle: Making  Shared  Growth Credible , 
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1996, cited in Bardhan 2000, fn.15). Bardhan also points out that 
“[w]here wealth distribution is relatively egalitarian because of land reform and widespread expansion of 
education and health services, as in large parts of East Asia, it has been somewhat easier to enlist the support of 
most social groups – and to isolate the extreme political wings of the labor movement – in making short-run 
sacrifices at times of macroeconomic crisis and coordinating stabilization and growth-promoting policies” 
(Bardhan, 2000, p.10).  
64  See an interesting study by Daron Acemoglu (‘Why not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, 
Commitment and Politics’, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 9377, 2002, pp.1-48) that 
tries to explain why different developmental paths were chosen by South and North Korea. While Acemoglu 
wanted to demonstrate that the difference was rooted in the difference of the structure of interest of politicians – 
the main argument of his paper – held in these two parts of the once single country, he finally fumbled and 
recognized it might have had to do with their differing world views and beliefs. 
65 North had long back insightfully alerted us to possibilities of different dynamics of institutional change in the 
context of institutional layering that I have already discussed: “There are the fundamental institutions that 
specify the basic ‘ground rules’ ...and then there are the secondary institutional arrangements which may be 
created without altering the basic institutions. The innovation of secondary institutional arrangements may 
sometimes take place without any political or legal change, but others require political implementation.  
Historically, many secondary institutional developments have been entirely consistent with existing basic 
institutions; but the implications of others have been in conflict with the status quo” (North, 1970, p.9). 
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and activities of the state. This, I submit, requires bringing back agents without sacrificing the 
useful insights from historical analysis, a combination of a diachronic with a synchronic 
analysis, to bridge the divide between macro and micro. A few examples of what the agents 
were doing to operationalize the developmental state in South Korea may help illustrate this. 
In an interesting account of how the developmental state functioned within a deep rooted 
culture of patron-clientalism in Korea, that had a long history in the Yi dynasty (1392-1910) 
in the form of yangban (patron-aristocrats) providing protection to the client-peasants for 
securing rents and tributes in return, Yoo discusses an amazing episode about how strategies 
were formulated to move onto a high growth path:66 
In 1973, Park announced a quixotic plan. By targeting six areas of 
industrialization – steel, chemical, metal, machine-building, ship-building, and 
electronics – Park demanded that the chaebols produce $10 billion in exports.... 
Park realized there was going to be a large demand for oil tankers ...and 
summoned Chong-Chu Yong (of Hyundai), ordering him to start building ships: 
Chong flew off to Greece and landed two contracts for 260,000-ton oil tankers, by 
promising cheaper and quicker delivery than any other company. He didn’t bother 
to mention that he had no shipyard to build them. He then put the two orders in 
front of Barclay’s Bank, and it lent him enough capital to build shipyards. No 
Korean knew how to do this; so Chong sent sixty engineers to Scotland to learn 
how. Two years later the tankers were finished, before the deadline. 
The truly surprising part of the story is not that Chong built his ships against all 
odds, but that Park was able to convince Chong to build ships in a shipyard yet to 
be built by engineers who did not know how to build ships ...Park was telling 
Chong that he would do everything within his power to support the success of 
Chong’s enterprise, and Chong took him at his word.67  
 
This episode, Yoo suggests, is a robust indicator that such a personalised approach to defining 
highly unconventional strategies was only possible in a context of the deep-rooted institution 
of patron-clientalism in South Korea. Thus, the key argument of his persuasive paper, based 
on an impressive range of evidence, is that it was not the Weberian, but the patron-clientalist 
character of the Korean State that was behind formulating and enforcing the peculiar 
strategies that pushed Korea on a high growth path. 
Taken together, the preceding discussion demonstrates that historically evolved institutional 
foundations, that structure the power relations more symmetrically, and credible threats to the 
political survival of the elite in power, can cause the orientation of the state to follow a path 
of shared progress. But, unless one examines what was actually done and why so as to 
concretely define and get on to that path effectively, the dynamics of the societal and political 
power structure on its own cannot explain the final outcomes, as they depend upon the role of 
‘institutional play’ as well – how the rules of the game were actually played out – that can 
even be contradictory to their formal structure.68 In the case of the shipbuilding project, the 
                                                 
66 Hyung-Gon Paul Yoo, ‘Corruption, Rule of Law, and Civil Society: Why  Patronage Politics Is Good for 
Developing Markets and Democracies’, International Affairs Review, 12:1 (2003), pp.32-33.  
67 Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, New York: W.W. Norton, 1997, p.324, cited in Yoo (2003), p.34 - 
emphasis added. 
68 My hunch is that the avowed patron-clientalism displayed in the actual implementation of developmental 
policies would not only have been absent in the formal structures of the policy rules, say the Industrial Policy of 
S. Korea, but even appeared contradictory to their universalistic design. 
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way General Park could motivate and push the business leaders to make such decisions, 
almost inconceivable if they were to decide on their own, following usual economic 
rationality in making business decisions, illustrates the need fo r investigating the role of 
institutional play, and, as a corollary, inter alia, of agency and ideas in making the casual 
story of change complete. 
It is here that historical institutionalism usually commits the fallacy of making a flawed causal 
jump to link micro and macro, and in the process also erroneously mixes up different layers 
and arenas of institutions. Changes in power structures may best explain the changes in the 
orientation of the state, but cannot fully account for differentials in the final outcomes, 
constant orientations. Also, while they can explain many alterations in the deep micro layers 
of certain, especially the political, institutions, but may be inadequate to understand the 
workings of meso-layers of, for example, different governmental institutions.  
Do institutionalists recognise facets such as these, and are they bringing them under the ambit 
of their investigations, especially to offer a more nuanced understanding of the macro-micro 
linkage? For answers, we must turn to the third shade of institutionalist inquiry, the 
sociological institutionalism, which seems to offer some promise. 
3.  Culture, therefore, world view matters  
To begin with, let me share a few thoughts:  
What do we mean by reality? How do beliefs get formed? How do they change? 
What is the relationship between beliefs and institutions? ...But whose perceptions 
matter? Obviously not everyone's; we need to delve into the structure of rule 
making in the society to answer that question ...For the most part economists, with 
a few very important exceptions like Hayek, have ignored the role of ideas in 
making choices ...The way we perceive the world and construct explanations 
about the world requires that we delve into how the mind and brain work, the 
subject of cognitive science. 
Reading these, it may be hard to imagine they are coming from the scholar who is viewed as 
the leading mind of NIE. It is North again, writing on 24 June 2003.69  North is raising here 
some fundamental questions, extremely challenging in nature, hence, predictably, remaining 
unanswered.  
But the sociological instititutionalists are delving into these complex issues. Developed as a 
reaction to formalism and the salience of the means-end rationality of organization theories of 
the 1970s, this school has redrawn attention to what Harriss calls “one of the most awkward 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
69 Douglass North, ‘Understanding the Process of Economic Change’, Forum 7 Institutional Barriers to 
Economic Change: Cases Considered, Forum Series on the Role of Institutions in Promoting Economic Growth, 
Mercatus Center, George Mason University and the IRIS Center, sponsored by USAID, 2003, pp.1-21. The 
quotations are arranged in a different sequence than in the text. I don’t know whether this can finally persuade 
scholars to consider that North has travelled far away from the initial conceptions of NIE and resolved the 
“constant tension between his commitment to the framework of choice-theoretic economics and his awareness of 
the limitations which it imposes when it comes to the analysis of change” (Harris, 2002, p.6). I, for one, think 
some fundamental shifts in North’s intellectual journey are demonstrated by, among others, his observations 
quoted above. See also Klaus Nielsen (‘Review of Institutionalist Approaches in the Social Sciences: Typology, 
Dialogue and Future Prospects’, Network Institutional Theory Research Paper no.7/01, Roskilde University, 
2001, p.14), who goes to the extent of suggesting that North has initiated a new Cognitive-Institutional Approach 
(CIA). 
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words in the English language”, i.e., ‘culture’.70 Sociological institutionalists argue that the 
boundaries between institutions and culture are blurred. In fact, institutions shade into culture. 
Ideas, values and symbols ultimately embed the formal rules of the game. This is important, 
but also not unknown. 71 The question is what new insights do these provide for understanding 
the workings of institutions? The researchers in this field answer this by claiming that their 
findings are helping to go beyond a general though strong, but arguably theoretically quite 
weak, reaction to the thin rationally assumption by demonstrating that individual preferences 
are culturally shaped and thus not exogenous to institutions. Individuals are not always 
engaged in maximising self- interest, whether for profit, rent or power, but also strive to attain 
identity and gain legitimacy in ways that are culturally constructed, and valued. Rules of the 
game are “not just formal rules, procedures or norms” that are devised by the strategic 
calculations of individuals, but are “the symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral 
templates that provide the ‘frames of meaning’ guiding human action,” that even “constitute 
the self- images and identities of social actors”. 72  
These thoughts enrich our perspective on what institutions are about, but ironically they make 
comprehension of institutional change more difficult. In the other schools, wealth-
maximisation or conflicts to gain a more inclusive and a more just order in society – the basic 
drives, though highly questioned – are regarded as the exogenous impetus for change. But, if 
these turn into culturally shaped constructs, thus dependent variables, then questions such as 
why and how preferences change (for example, from collectively-oriented social preferences 
to that of individualistic wealth-maximising self- interest), or why institutions transform in 
ways that escape from cultural influence, demand plausible answers. And if the answer is that 
they change because cultures change, then we run into circularity with the question: why do 
cultures change? 
However, sociologists alert us to the fact that this oversocialized view of individuals, and 
treating of culture as a latent-variable, held in the past, are now yielding to ones that treat: 
culture as fragmented across groups and inconsistent across its manifestations. 
The view of culture as values that suffuse other aspects of belief, intention, and 
collective life has succumbed to one of culture as complex rule- like structures that 
constitute resources that can be put to strategic use (emphasis added).  
In other words, culture is viewed as a “grab-bag of odds and ends: a pastiche of mediated 
representations, a repertoire of techniques, or a toolkit of strategies”. 73  
                                                 
70 Harriss (2002), p.8. 
71 One of the major though provocative attempts to read off policy distortions in cultural terms was advanced by 
Myron Weiner, a highly respected scholar on India, who argued that the problem of child labour and lack of 
commitment to universalizing primary education both by the state and the societal actors and organizations in 
India was due to the deep roots of the values of the caste system, that denigrated the lower class in the society 
and did not consider them fit for education (Myron Weiner, The Child and the State in India: Child Labor and 
Education Policy in Comparative Perspective , Princeton, N.J : Princeton University Press, 1991). More recently, 
see Svetozar Pejovich (‘Understanding the Transaction Costs of Transition: It’s the Culture, Stupid’, Forum 
Series on the Role of Institutions in Promoting Economic Growth, Mercatus Center at George Mason University 
and the IRIS Center, sponsored by USAID, 2003, pp.1-37) for arguments that also place great emphasis on the 
role of cultural factors in creating resistance to introducing market economy in the transition countries.  
72 Hall & Taylor (1996), pp.14 & 18. 
73 P. J. DiMaggio, ‘Culture and cognition’, American Review of Sociology, 23 (1997), pp.263-87. However, not 
everybody agrees. Interestingly, even DiMaggio’s own findings (see P. J. DiMaggio, ‘The New 
Institutionalisms: Avenues of Collaboration’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 154:4 (1998), 
pp.696-705) are questioned on this issue by Nielsen, who observes that his presentation of the key themes of 
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But, this is begging the question. If culture is not entirely constitutive, and if people can use 
culture strategically, then questions such as what those strategies are, what are the sources of 
their availability, for what uses they are employed, and why these are preferred – which were 
thought to have been resolved by bringing culture back in – bounce back to life. No amount of 
reinforcing findings such as “all cultures, though by definition they involve enduring habits, 
are both contested within the field of power, and they are all the time being reflexively 
reworked or reinvented”;74 actors are “cultural puppets but like Pinocchio they can break 
away from the strings”; 75 or, individuals are “culturally formed but not totally socialized”, 76 
can prove helpful, as they too do not answer the questions such positions necessarily give rise 
to (e.g., what configures the contests around, and what are the referrals to reflexive reworking 
of, culturally shaped values, thoughts and habits?).  
Even the ideas of institutional logics advanced by Friedland and Alford, describing them as 
sets “of material practices and symbolic constructions” that constitute an institutional order’s 
“organizing principles” and are “available to organizations and individuals to elaborate”77 (a 
kind of ‘practical reasoning,’ whereby the individual works with and reworks the available 
institutional templates to devise a course of action),78 do not help much, as the drivers and 
directions of the hinted elaborations of the ‘material practices and symbolic constructions’ 
themselves remain unelaborated. 
These problematics also limit the strength of ideas on institutional change this school 
advances. Change is viewed as resulting from a “logic of social appropriateness” in contrast 
to a “logic of instrumentality”. 79 That is, enhancing culturally valued social legitimacy rather 
than efficiency in transactions as driving institutions to change,. This is because, as a direct 
corollary of such a view, questions such as what constitutes the authority behind the 
legitimacy of one type of institution vis-à-vis other;80 is it culturally shaped (in which case, 
the problem of infinite regression: what is the authority behind the authority?); or, does it 
have an outside referral (in which case, the problem of exogeneity and the related vexed 
questions as to why such an exogenous construct is viewed as an authority to define or confer 
legitimacy upon certain institutions?), can seriously challenge this perspective.  
Can we meet, or obviate, these awkward questions if we take the interpretative view on 
culture more seriously, as the institutional logics perspective does, and consider changes as 
“simultaneously material and symbolic transformations of the world”, which involve “not 
                                                                                                                                                        
Sociological Cultural Institutionalism perpetuate this social-constructionist view point, in so far as those themes 
argue that “all elements of rational-action models – actors, interests and preferences – are ‘socially constructed’ 
and therefore endogenous. Research is focused on informal institutions such as schemata, roles, scripts, or 
‘taken-for-grantedness’. Institutional change is seen as a process of isomorphism or diffusion through 
mechanisms such as pressures to appear legitimate and normative schemes embedded in training and practice” 
(Nielsen, 2001, p.4). My reading is different, and I think DiMaggio is advancing the ideas of a deliberative view 
of culture. 
74 Harriss (2002), p.10. 
75 A. Mayhew, ‘Contrasting origins of the two institutionalisms: the social sciences context’, Review of Political 
Economy , 1:3 (1989), pp.319-334, cited in Nielsen (2001), p.12. 
76 G. M. Hodgson, ‘Institutional economic theory: the old versus the new’, Review of Political Economy , 1:3 
(1988), pp.249-269, cited in Nielsen (2001), p.12. 
77 R. Friedland & R. Alford, ‘Bringing Society back in: Symbols, Practices, and Institutional Contradictions’, in 
W. W. Powell and  P. DiMaggio (eds), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp.248-249, cited in DiMaggio (1997) – emphasis added. 
78 Hall & Taylor (1996), p.16. 
79 John L. Campbell, ‘Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas in Political Economy’, Paper presented to the 
Seminar on The State and Capitalism since 1800 , Harvard University, 1995, cited in Hall & Taylor (1996), p.16. 
80 Hall &Taylor (1996), p.18. 
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only shifts in the structure of power and interests, but in the definition of power and 
interests”.81  Some scholars think we can:  
[T]he proponents of this view see the project of institutional changes not simply 
as a ‘material project’ but also as a ‘cultural project’ in the sense that changes in 
institutions require (or at least are helped by) changes in the ‘worldview’ of the 
agents involved. And once we allow the possibility of ‘cultural manipulation’, the 
role of human agency becomes a lot more important than in any other version of 
the theories of institutional change that we have talked about, as it is necessarily 
the human agents who actively interpret the world (albeit under the influences of 
existing institutions) and develop discourses that justify the particular worldview 
that they hold. Indeed, we should not forget, to paraphrase Marx, that it is human 
beings who make history, although they may not make it in contexts of their own 
choosing.82 
 
I am absolutely in agreement with this view as far as it places importance on the role of 
agency, a point that has been a constant theme of my reflections in this paper. But, even by 
correctly bringing agency back in, we still may not be doing much better analytically in 
unravelling the questions raised above due to the choice of the route of ‘world view’, or 
‘mental model’ (schemata, epistemic), for doing so. The questions trail us, albeit in altered 
forms.  I will return to this later. But, for now, it is apt to observe that our journey to search 
for an understanding of institutional change seems to have reached an interesting turn: from 
exploring how helpful (or not) are the issues of politics and power (macro level), transaction 
costs (meso level), and culture (micro or deep structure level) in unravelling how formal and 
informal rules change; to entering into the realms of the human mind. We had not even 
visualised that this level would also be required in our explorations, hence had not thought of 
a term for it. Shall we call it the ‘fundamental level’? We may, if we recall how almost 45 
years ago the issue of ‘mind’ was viewed by a highly perceptive scholar. Examining the 
puzzles of development in Latin America, Hirschman had “place[d] the difficulties of 
development back where all difficulties of human action begin and belong: in the mind”. 83 
Mental models and their connections with institutional change is an emerging field of inquiry, 
bringing cognitive psychologists, sociologists, and even political scientists somewhat closer, 
though a lot of ground remains to be covered. DiMaggio draws out a few lessons from the 
recent advancements made in this field that are worth noting. For example, he points out that 
recent research on human cognition supports the latent-variable view on culture. A large set 
of indiscriminately assembled and relatively unorganized, and even conflicting symbols, 
thoughts, beliefs, and values are stored in memory as a collection of odds and ends. These 
explain an individual’s capacity to deal with multiple traditions, even comprising of 
inconsistent elements; maintain distinctive and inconsistent action frames in response to 
varying contextual cues; and hold contradictory expressions of attitude over time.  
However, this tool-kit view of culture implies a more pronounced need for organization of the 
disparate elements in cognition to render the world intelligible, than did the earlier 
oversocialized view of cognition. This involves a partial selection from the ‘grab bag of odds 
                                                 
81  Friedland & Alford (1991), p.246, cited by Chang & Evans (2000), p.17 – emphasis added. 
82 Chang & Evans (2000), p.18. 
83 A. O. Hirschman, A Strategy of Economic Development, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958, p.11, cited 
in Paulo Seri, ‘Losing areas and shared mental models: towards a definition of the cognitive obstacles to local 
development’, paper prepared for presentation at the DRUID Winter Conference, 2001, p.4. 
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and ends’ for constructing schemata, or mental models, to bring some coherence or 
intelligibility in perceiving and negotiating with the outside world.  How is this achieved? 
“Automatic cognition”, or everyday cognition, that is made of “typification, of the habitus, of 
the cognitive shortcuts that promote efficiency at the expense of synoptic accuracy”, is one 
source of this ordering. It has parallels in sociological understandings of how 
“institutionalized structures and behaviours are taken for granted, reproduced in everyday 
action and treated as legitimate.” But more significant are the findings on “deliberative 
learning,” which, though not easily activated, when achieved under certain conditions 
(problem situation; dissatisfaction with status quo; and failure of existing mental model to 
account for new stimuli) can enable overriding of “programmed modes of thoughts to think 
critically and reflectively”.84 Interestingly, even the political scientists, working in the 
tradition of rational choice and using game theoretic approaches, are seriously employing the 
concept of mental model and are looking into how histories shape them to make more 
nuanced analysis of political behaviour.85 At the same time, development researchers are 
using this idea to understand problems of local development even in the developed western 
world.86 
In the light of this brief discussion, one may return to the questions to see if the findings on 
how mental models are constructed and change answer them. I think the difficulties do not go 
away. The following illustration will help. The mental model concept may suggest, as evident 
from the preceding discussion, an inherent role of agency in interpretative and creative 
interactions with cultural resources in constructing and changing a worldview (especially 
through deliberative cognition). But what remains unclear are issues such as: what parameters 
agency employs in making selections of, and reflections on, cultural resources to impose an 
order on the grab bag of odds and ends, and also change it under certain conditions; what is 
the basis of their selection in the first place; and how do those parameters remain 
unconstrained by culture to allow overriding of programmed modes of thinking, while also 
simultaneously remaining under its influence? If mental models allow intelligibility to the 
outside world, it implies a congruence with its status quo position. How, then, does a 
dissatisfaction with the status quo arise, and in reference to what, so as to lead to a revaluation 
of the model and effect its change? Similarly, perception and evaluation of the failure of 
existing schemata to account for external cues raise the issue of what benchmarks an agency 
employs and why such a conclusion should be reached. 
Surely we need more research to develop these ideas more robustly and usefully for 
understanding institutional change. But, to my mind, insights emerging from sociological 
institutionalists oriented towards developing more nuanced understandings of how culture 
plays a role in structuring a broader preference set for actors to strive for, providing broader 
meanings to the issues of power and conflict, and especially in drawing attention to agency’s 
reflective and deliberative involvement in social change, unresolved dilemmas about these 
notwithstanding, are helpful. They need to be tested and refined through rigorous inter- and 
intra-nation comparative case studies.  
To close, perhaps we would do well to reinforce the observations made in the preceding 
paragraph with those of Denzau and North, which, indeed, are striking: 
                                                 
84 These are from DiMaggio (1997). 
85 John W. Schliemann, ‘History and Emotions, Beliefs and Mental Models: Toward a Hermeneutics of Rational 
Choice’, 2002, at http://alpha.fdu.edu/~schieman/research/mental-models.pdf. 
86 Seri (2001). 
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The mental models that the mind creates and the institutions that individuals 
create are both an essential part of the way human beings structure their 
environment in their interactions with it. An understanding of how they evolve 
and the relationship between them is the single most important step that research 
in the social sciences can make to replace the black box of the ‘rationality’ 
assumption used in economics and rational choice models.87 
 
Concluding observations  
A few general observations, illustratively made in the context of rational choice 
institutionalism, that apply to the institutionalist perspective as a whole, are in order here. The 
thin rationality issue has been repeatedly discussed. There is absolutely no doubt that it is the 
weakest spot in the rational choice frame of analysis. But a mere dismissal will not do.  
First, the multiplicity of institutions, and people’s capacity to employ multiple rationality 
assumptions or preferences while working with them, require closer attention. Self- interest 
expressed in terms of wealth maximisation may play a prominent role within the economic 
institutions in life, though there too, as I argue below, it is unlikely that it works in solitude. 
However, this should not lead us to think that this, or some other equally thin equivalent, 
guides individual behaviour in other spheres of life too. Individuals may take their own 
brothers’ lives in conflict over family property disputes, but may also give their lives for 
matters of honour and dignity. 
Second, even though the self- interest of wealth maximisation in market transactions may be 
easily observable and quantifiable, there may still exist other preferences, even if not at its 
root (though I suspect they are), working in conjunction with it to guide institutional 
development in the economic realm. Much of the story of the evolution of complex economic 
institutions (banking, etcetera) in the West, when viewed only from a transaction cost 
perspective, naturally focuses on the efficiency criteria. But the urge to establish conditions 
for a just and fair exchange relationship has driven the story too. Bardhan’s discussion on how 
reducing opportunism in transactions among people largely unknown to one another,88 and 
North’s discussion of externality, point to the fact that a serious concern of the traders was to 
ensure they were not cheated.  
Why do people want to avoid being cheated? It is not because it means loss of wealth, though 
that too remains a factor. This is because, at least in part, people feel a sense of injustice or 
unfairness in such an exchange situation. It is not uncommon to find wealthy western tourists 
in a rage after realising they were cheated by the auto drivers in India, or haggling with them 
to avoid such an eventuality, for a few rupees, when those may be equivalent to a few cents, 
which they rarely carry back when returned by restaurants to avoid the hassle of juggling with 
small coins. This behaviour pattern expresses a deep-seated urge to resist being subjected to 
unjust, thus unacceptable, exchange relationship in a society. If this is correct, then it will be 
quite unjust to conclude that wealth-maximisation preference drove the evolution of the 
institution of pre-paid taxi counters at the Indian airports, the undisputed gains to the taxi 
drivers (the counters are run by their associations) and the government (more foreign 
exchange) from the greater inflow of tourists notwithstanding.   
                                                 
87 Denzau & D. C. North, ‘Shared mental models: Ideologies and Institutions’, Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics (1994). 
88 Bardhan (2000), pp.2-4. 
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Take another case. I have a strong suspicion that a firm such as Infosys in India,89 and the 
actors working within, may not exhibit any signs of departure in their wealth maximisation 
preferences in their usual inter- firm and firm-client transactions. Yet creativity, setting 
worldwide standards of professional excellence, visions of changing society through the 
knowledge revolution have also driven the actors involved in building this institution in ways 
that make Infosys be what it is like today.  
Similar is the case in other non-economic phenomenon, where institutional developments, or 
impediments to it, arise from a play of multiple sets of preferences juggled by individuals. 
Institutionalists employing rational choice methods will also do well here to identify the 
preferences as a spectrum-like structure and conditions that allow preference switching. The 
problem is that maximising power, once again more amenable to observation and reduction 
into model building, remains the focus of research, disallowing more nuanced findings, and 
even restricting the researchers from raising the right questions. It is therefore not uncommon 
to find researchers getting into the trap of the fallacy of inverted causality. Studying a policy 
and finding its failure in implementing its intent, though resulting in political benefits (for 
example, an effect on expanding the vote banks of the politicians in power), lead to an easy 
causal inference that the polices were pursued to maximise power. This backward causal 
linkage (judging an action by its outcome) must be double examined by the forward flow of 
causality (under what understanding of the more certain political costs in the present, and the 
distant and more hazy future political benefits, were those polices formulated? If costs were 
perceived to be higher, then why was such a risky path was chosen?) to uncover the reasons 
for pursing such a policy, notwithstanding its ex-post political payoffs.  
Third, once we take seriously the concept that preferences exist as a spectrum, and preference 
switching is possible, the role of ideas, highly neglected in the institutionalist inquiry as 
admitted by North himself,90 can assume their much-needed salience. Novel ideas, their 
presentation style, and deliberations and persuasion can have a vast impact on altering the 
internal hierarchy of the preferences to socially more beneficial forms. I am not arguing this is 
easy. It is very challenging. But, studies must document and analyse how ideas have played 
successful roles in altering the preference structure, whenever they have, to let us know how 
challenges have been met in those cases.  
Finally, leadership occupying institutionally powerful positions is another variable that works 
on its own, as well as adds robustness to the role of ideas, in positively impacting on the 
preference switching processes, and solving such collective action problems which may have 
remained unresolved despite a labyrinth of rules and regulations. The definition of institution 
comprises both rules and their enforcement structures. We often focus on the former and 
generate puzzles of existence of inefficient institutions despite having efficient rules, but 
ignore that the problem may lie elsewhere at the enforcement level. Leadership, in so far as it 
enhances the efficacy of this latter element of institution, inter alia, makes a difference. In the 
abstract notion of actor and agency, the distinctiveness of leadership, despite being played out 
by one or the other actor, remains poorly explored. In academic research, there is now an 
increasing, though extremely slow, recognition of this factor. Yet, it is seen more as a unique 
or an idiosyncratic variable, and, thus, is employed to explain deviant (positive) cases as a 
composite category, as a black box.  
                                                 
89 A software development company, that started with a handful of Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) 
graduates with about Rs. 10,000 ($200) initial investment, that has risen in a short span of last about 15 years to 
become a multi-billion dollar software giant in India, and has been internationally acclaimed for its innovative 
business practices.    
90 North (2003).  
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There is a need is to deconstruct it and look for what strategies leaders employ, how they 
differently use institutional resources (authority and the rule structure embedded in the 
position they hold), and how they synthesize inside knowledge of the institution and external 
ideas to generate different perceptions about a problem and innovative solutions that 
sometimes lead to ‘gestalt shifts’ in preference structures of other institutional actors to 
unlock the institutions’ welfare-enhancing potentials. Once such a deconstructed analysis of 
leadership is undertaken, what might come to attention is the concept of institutional play that 
I have already briefly discussed. This can highlight that possibilities for innovatively playing 
the rules of the game may exist to unleash their enabling potentials, without necessarily 
altering their basic, or even the broad framework of the meso- level structure, which for 
historical reasons might have assumed constraining characteristics. In other words, what may 
come to light is that history matters, indeed, in structuring the rules in ways that make their 
play inefficient and also path dependent. But, it still leaves spaces for conceiving alternate 
games that can be played out within the same structure to both change the outcomes in the 
present, and also trigger contradictory pressures on the structure that can cumulate in the 
future to alter the very structure as well.    
Some of these thoughts equally apply to the other schools discussed in the paper, besides 
other reflections made on their strength and limitations at appropriate places in the text. And 
these ideas will be developed further, subjecting them to scrutiny in relation to the 
ethnographic details and findings of the case studies on reforms in Madhya Pradesh, that I 
intend to discuss in a companion paper. I must, therefore, end this more abstract discussion, 
lest it transcend to the fourth or fifth order of abstraction, that Scott is so concerned of91 – and 
I am in absolute agreement with him – which may disconnect us from the reality the 
abstractions are intended to capture.  
 
 
                                                 
91 James Scott makes this interesting observation in Kohli et al (1996), p.20: “I personally have never been able 
to think my way through a fourth–order extractions or simplification without embedding it in a concrete case. I 
just cannot understand fourth – order extractions; once there are four or five or them simultaneously in the air, I 
am essentially lost because I have no empirical reference”. 
 25
References 
Acemoglu, Daron, ‘Why not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and 
Politics’, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 9377, 2002, pp.1-48  
Acemoglu, Daron; Johnson, Simon and Robinson, James A., ‘The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation’, American Economic Review, 91:5 
(2001), pp.1369-1401 
Adelman, Irma, ‘Social Development in Korea, 1953-1993’, at 
http://are.berkeley.edu/~adelman/KOREA.html 
Amsden, A., Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989  
Bardhan, Pranab, ‘Understanding Underdevelopment: Challenges for Institutional Economics 
from the Poor Country Perspective’, Villa Borsig Workshop Series 2000 - The Institutional 
Foundations of a Market Economy, 2000, pp.1-17 
Boettke, Peter J., ‘The New Comparative Political Economy’, Forum Series on the Role of 
Institutions in Promoting Economic Growth, Directed by the Mercatus Center at George 
Mason University and the IRIS Center Sponsored by USAID, 2003, pp.1-43 
Burki, Shahid Javed and Perry, Guillermo E., Beyond The Washington Consensus: 
Institutions Matter, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1998 
Campbell, John L., ‘Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas in Political Economy’, Paper 
presented to the Seminar on The State and Capitalism since 1800, Harvard University, 1995  
Campos, E. and Root, H. L., The Key to the East Asian Miracle: Making  Shared  Growth 
Credible, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1996  
Chang, Ha-Joon, ‘Industrial Policy and East Asia: The Miracle, the Crisis, and the Future’, a 
revised version of the paper presented at the World Bank workshop on Re-thinking East Asian 
Miracle, San Francisco, 16-17 February 1999 
Chang, Ha-Joon, ‘An Institutionalist Perspective on the Role of the State: Towards an 
Institutionalist Political Economy’, in L. Burlamaqui, A. Castro & H-J. Chang (eds), 
Institutions and the Role of the State, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000, pp.3-26  
Chang, Ha-Joon, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective, 
London: Anthem Press, 2002 
Chang, Ha-Joon and Evans, Peter, ‘The Role of Institutions in Economic Change’, Paper 
prepared for the meeting of the Other Canon group, Venice, Italy (13 – 14 January 2000), pp.   
1-67, at http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/faculty/chang/c&e-pdf.pdf 
Cheng, T.; Haggard, S. and Kang, D., ‘Institutions and Growth in Korea and Taiwan: The 
Bureaucracy’, Journal of Development Studies, 34:6 (1998) 
Clark, Gregory and Wolcott, Susan, ‘Why Nations Fail: Managerial Decisions and 
Performance in Indian Cotton Textiles 1890-1938’, Journal of Economic History. 59:2 
(1999), pp.97-123 
Clark, Gregory and Wolcott, Susan, ‘One Polity, Many Countries: Economic Growth in India, 
1873-2000’, in Dani Rodrik (ed.), In Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic 
Growth, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003  
Coase, Ronald, ‘The New Institutional Economics’, The American Economic Review, 88:2 
(1998), pp.72-74 
 26
Coser, Lewis, ‘Presidential Address: Two Methods in Search of a Substance’, American 
Sociological Review, 40 (1975), pp.691-700 
Crisis Sates Programme, ‘Concepts and Research Agenda’, Crisis States Working Paper 
No.1, London: Development Research Centre, LSE, 2001, pp.1-11 
Cumings, Bruce, Korea’s Place in the Sun, New York: W.W. Norton, 1997 
Denzau and North, D.C., ‘Shared mental models: Ideologies and Institutions’, Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics (1994) 
De Soto, H., The Other Path, New York: Harper, 1989 
Di Maggio, P. J., ‘Culture and cognition’, American Review of Sociology, 23 (1997), pp.263-
87 
DiMaggio, P. J., ‘The New Institutionalisms: Avenues of Collaboration’, Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 154:4 (1998), pp.696-705 
Dunham, David, ‘States, Reforms and Institutional Change: On the Dynamics of Failure’, 
paper given at Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, Oslo, 24-26 June 2002 
Evans, P., Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1995 
Friedland, R. and Alford, R., ‘Bringing Society back in: Symbols, Practices, and Institutional 
Contradictions’, in W. W. Powell and  P. DiMaggio (eds), The New Institutionalism in 
Organizational Analysis, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp.223-262 
Gourevitch, Peter Alexis, ‘The Governance Problem in International Relations’, in David 
Lake and Robert Powell (eds.), Strategic Choice and International Relations, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000, pp.137-164 
Gray, John, ‘The Illusion of a Minimum State’, LSE Public Service Seminar Series, 1997, 
pp.1-15 
Grendstad, Gunnar and Per Selle, ‘Cultural Theory and the New Institutionalism’, Journal of 
Theoretical Politics, 7:1 (1995) 
Grindle, Merilee S., ‘In Quest of the Political: The Political Economy of Development Policy 
Making’, CID Working Paper No. 17, Harvard University, 1999 
Hall, Peter A. and Taylor, Rosemary C. R., ‘Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms’, Discussion Paper 96/6, Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, 
1996, pp.1-32 
Harriss, John, ‘Institutions, Politics and Culture: A Case for “Old” Institutionalism in the 
Study of Historical Change’, DESTIN Working Paper Series No.02-34, 2002 
Hirschman, A. O., A Strategy of Economic Development, New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1958 
Hirschman, Albert, ‘The On-and-Off connection between Political and Economic Progress’, 
American Economic Review, 84:2 (1994), pp.343-348 
Hodgson, G. M., ‘Institutional economic theory: the old versus the new’, Review of Political 
Economy, 1:3 (1988), pp.249-269 
Jütting, Johannes, ‘Institutions and Development: A Critical Review’, OECD Technical 
Papers, No. 210, 2003 
 27
Kohli, Atul; Evans, Peter; Katzenstein, Peter J.; Przeworski, Adam; Rudolph, Susanne 
Hoeber; Scott, James C. and Skocpol, Theda, ‘The Role Theory in Comparative Politics: A 
Symposium’, World Politics, 48:1 (1996), pp.1-49 
Kuhn, Thomas S., ‘Historical Structure of Scientific Discovery’, Science 136:3518 (1962), 
pp.760-764 
Mayhew, A., ‘Contrasting origins of the two institutionalisms: the social sciences context’, 
Review of Political Economy, 1:3 (1989), pp.319-334 
Menger, C., Problems of Economics and Sociology, translated by F. J. Nock, Urbana, IL: 
University of Illinois Press, 1963 [1883] 
Nelson, Richard R. and Sampat, Bhaven N., ‘Making sense of institutions as a factor shaping 
economic performance’, Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization, 44 (2001), pp.31–
54  
Nielsen, Klaus, ‘Review of Institutionalist Approaches in the Social Sciences: Typology, 
Dialogue and Future Prospects’, Network Institutional Theory Research Paper no.7/01, 
Roskilde University, 2001, pp.1-18 
North, Douglass C., ‘Institutional Change and Economic Development’, The Journal of 
Economic History, 31:1 (1971), pp.118-125 
North, D., ‘Transaction Costs, Institutions, and Economic History’, Journal of Institutional 
and Theoretical Economics, 140 (1984)  
North, Douglass C., ‘Economic Performance Through Time’, American Economic Review, 
84:3 (1994), pp.359-368 
North, Douglass C., ‘Understanding the Process of Economic Change’, Forum 7 Institutional 
Barriers to Economic Change: Cases Considered, Forum Series on the Role of Institutions in 
Promoting Economic Growth, Mercatus Center, George Mason University and the IRIS 
Center, sponsored by USAID, 2003, pp.1-21 
North, Douglass C. and Thomas, Robert Paul, ‘An Economic Theory of the Growth of the 
Western World’, The Economic History Review, 23:1 (1970), pp.1-17 
Pejovich, Svetozar, ‘Understanding the Transaction Costs of Transition: It’s the Culture, 
Stupid’, Forum Series on the Role of Institutions in Promoting Economic Growth, Mercatus 
Center at George Mason University and the IRIS Center, sponsored by USAID, 2003, pp.1-37 
Pierson, Paul, ‘Explaining Institutional Origins and Change’, 2001, draft chapter from Politics 
in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis, manuscript in progress, at 
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~pierson/ch4.pdf 
Pierson, Paul and Skocpol, Theda, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political 
Science’, in Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner (eds), Political Science: The State of the 
Discipline, New York & London: Norton, 2002, pp.1-32 
Putzel, J., ‘Accounting for the dark side of social capital’, Journal of International 
Development, 9:7 (1997), pp.939-949 
Putzel, J., ‘Developmental States and Crony Capitalists’, in P. Massina (ed.), Rethinking 
Development in East Asia: From Illusory Miracle to Economic Crisis, Richmond: Curzon 
Press, 2002, pp.189-222 
 28
Qian, Yingyi, ‘The Process of China's Market Transition (1978-98): The Evolutionary, 
Historical, and Comparative Perspectives’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics, 156:1 (2000), pp.151-171 
Qian, Yingyi, ‘How Reform Worked in China’, Working Paper, Department of Economics, 
University of California, Berkeley, 2002, pp.1-62 
Robertson, David Brian, ‘The Return to History and the New Institutionalism in American 
Political Science’, Social Science History, 17:1 (1993) 
Robinson, J. A., Theories of ‘Bad Policy’ Los Angeles: University of Southern California, 
1995 
Rodrik, Dani, ‘Development Strategies for the Next Century’, paper given at the conference 
on Developing Economics in the 21st Century, Institute for Developing Economics, Japan. 
UNU/WIDER, 2000, pp.1-38 
Rodrik, Dani, ‘Institutions, Integration, and Geography: In Search of the Deep Determinants 
of Economic Growth’, CID Working Paper, Harvard University, 2002  
Rodrik, Dani; Subramanian, Arvind and Trebbi, Francesco, ‘Institutions Rule: The Primacy 
Of Institutions Over Geography And Integration In Economic Development’, CID Working 
Paper No. 97, Harvard University, 2002 
Schliemann, John W., ‘History and Emotions, Beliefs and Mental Models: Toward a 
Hermeneutics of Rational Choice’, paper delivered at the 2002 Meetings of the American 
Political Science Association, Boston, Massachusetts, 28 August – 1 September 2002; the 
Workshop on History, Rationality and Agency in Social Science, Columbia University, 16 
April 2002; and at the Culture, History, and Institutions Seminar, Rutgers University, 29 April 
2002, at http://alpha.fdu.edu/~schieman/research/mental-models.pdf 
Seri, Paolo, ‘Losing areas and shared mental models: towards a definition of the cognitive 
obstacles to local development’, paper prepared for presentation at the DRUID Winter 
Conference, 2001 
Simon, Herbert A., Models of Bounded Rationality, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982 
Skocpol, Theda, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, 
and China, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979 
Stiglitz, Joseph E., ‘Populists Are Sometimes Right’, Project Syndicate (June 2003), at 
http://www.project-
syndicate.cz/commentaries/commentary_text.php4?id=1234&lang=1&m=contributor 
Wade, R., Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in Taiwan's 
Industrialization, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990 
Weiner, Myron, The Child and the State in India: Child Labor and Education Policy in 
Comparative Perspective, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, c1991 
Williamson, Oliver E., ‘Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory’, Industrial 
and Corporate Change, 2 (1993), pp.107-156 
Woo-Cumings, M., ‘Introduction: Chalmers Johnson and the Politics of Nationalism and 
Development’, in M. Woo-Cumings (ed.), The Developmental State, Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1999 
 29
Yoo, Hyung-Gon Paul, ‘Corruption, Rule of Law, and Civil Society: Why  Patronage Politics 
Is Good for Developing Markets and Democracies’, International Affairs Review, 12:1 
(2003), pp.24-45 
Young, H. Peyton, Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of 
Institutions, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998 
 30
Discussion Papers in Series 
 
DP1 James Putzel, ‘The Politics of ‘Participation’: Civil Society, the State and Development Assistance’ 
(January 2004) 
DP2 James Putzel, ‘The ‘new’ imperialism and possibilities of co-existence’ (January 2004) 
DP3 Jean-Paul Faguet, ‘Democracy in the Desert: Civil Society, Nation Building and Empire’ (January 
2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These can be downloaded from the Crisis States website (www.crisisstates.com), where an up-to-date list of all 
our publications and events can be found. 
  
